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Voorhees of Chicago, Treasurer. Mr. Thomas W. Davis of Wil-
mington continues as a member of the Executive Committee, having
been elected last year for a three-year term. An invitation was ex-
tended to the Executive Committee to hold its winter meeting in
Asheville next February.
The North Carolina delegation chose the following officers: T. C.
Guthrie, Sr., of Charlotte, Vice-President for North Carolina; Alex-
ander B. Andrews of Raleigh, member of General Council for North
Carolina; and T. S. Rollins of Asheville, Henry E. Faison of Clinton,
Kenneth C. Royall of Goldsboro, and Henry M. London of Raleigh,
members of the Local Council.
In addition to the above, the following members of the North
Carolina Bar attended the meeting: J. Crawford Biggs, Raleigh;
J. H. Bridgers, Henderson; Thomas W. Davis, Wilmington; Lincoln
L. Kellogg, Asheville; Charles T. McCormick, Chapel Hill; W. T.
Morgan, Marion; K. Van Winkle, Asheville; R. M. Wells, Asheville;
Vonno L. Gudger, Asheville.
At a recent meeting of the Executive Committee of the North
Carolina Bai Association it was decided to hold the next annual
meeting of the Association at Pinehurst, North Carolina, on May
1, 2 and 3, 1930. At that meeting addresses will be made by Hon.
Wm. D. Mitchell, Attorney-General of the United States, Governor
0. Max Gardner and Hon. Henry Upson Sims, President of the
American Bar Association. Hon. Kenneth C. Royall, of Goldsboro,
was elected to fill out the unexpired term of President T. L. Caudle
whose untimely death occurred September 4, 1929.
NOTES
PAYMENT TO ONE JOINT PAYEE
Dawson & White v. Nat'l. Bank of Greenville, 197 N. C. 499,
150 S. E. 38 (1929), was an "action by the payees to recover of
the drawee bank the amount of a check, payable to their order," which
the drawee-defendant is alleged to have paid, without indorsement, to
some unauthorized person, not the plaintiffs. The court viewing
this erroneous payment as equivalent to a certification of the check,
allowed plaintiffs to recover. It is believed that no useful purpose
is served by treating payment to one not a lawful holder- as an accept-
'The check is said by the statement of facts to have been "presented for
payment by a holder, without the indorsement of the payees." (Italics ours).
NOTES
ance of the check in favor of the rightful owner and, as observed in
a previous comment,2 many leading authorities condemn that view.
But the present appeal presents an additional issue of importance
which will be considered briefly herein.
"Defendants offered evidence which they insist tended to show
that the amount of the check was paid to one of the payees." The
evidence was excluded at trial and this ruling was upheld. If the
plaintiffs had been partners, as the title of the case suggests,3 it would
certainly have been in order for either partner to have received pay-
ment as agent for the firm, and the evidence offered would then have
been proper.4 If, as the record shows, they were not partners, they
were evidently joint payees 5 and the question of whether payment
to one discharges the debt is not so easily answered. At common law
one of two joint creditors could receive payment on an obligation
and give a discharge therefor.6 Proceeding on that theory a few
The word "holder" is here used in a non-technical sense, for unless the person
mentioned was one of the payees or an indorsee he would not be a holder. N.
I. L. §191, Cons. Stat. N. C. 2976.
'7 N. C. L. REv. 191 (1929).
"'Larry Dawson and D. G. White, trading as Dawson and White, v. Nat'l.
Bank of Greenville." The record on appeal (Vol. 5, fall term, 1928) shows that
the plaintiffs were a landlord and tenant disposing of a crop jointly owned.
'Each partner has implied power to collect debts due the firm. Mechem,
Elements of Partnership (2 ed.), §260; Gilmore, Partnership, §102. See
Black Mountain R. R. v. Ocean Ace. and Guar. Co., 175 N. C. 566, 96 S. E. 25(1918).
N. I. L. §8 (4), N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2989 (4). But not joint
tenants in all respects. Adams, J., in Dozier v. Leary, 196 N. C. 12, 144 S. E.
368 (1928) declared joint payees to be tenants in common.
*Mangrum's Admrs. v. Sims, 4 N. C. (1 Car. L. Repos. 547) 160 (1814),
semble, administrators; Richardson v. Jones, 23 N. C. 296 (1840), semble:
Legrand v.' Baker, 6 T. B. Mon. 235 (Ky. 1827) ; Morrow v. Starke, 4 J. J.
Marsh, 367 (Ky. 1838); Jenkins v. Williams, 191 Ky. 165, 229 S. W. 94, 96
(1921), semble; People v. Keyser, 28 N. Y. 226, 228 (1863), executors; Bowes
v. Seeger, 8 Watts & S. 222 (Pa. 1844), assignees of mortgage in trust;
State v. Rose, 71 Tenn. 531, 534 (1879), semble; Allen v. So. Penn. Oil Co., 72
W. Va., 155, 77 S. E. 905 (1913) ; also Harding v. Parshall, 56 Ill. 219, 226
(1870), payment even after notice by other joint obligee not to pay; Jens
Marie Oil Co. v. Rixse, 72 Okla. 93, 178 Pac. 658 (1919), payment to wife joint
lessor with husband even though title to leased premises was in husband; Bank
of Guntersville v. U. S. Fidel. and Guar. Co., 201 Ala. 19, 75 So. 168, 170
(1917), payment of dividends to one joint owner even though others were minors.
And see Lyman v. Gedney, 114 II. 388, 29 N. E. 282, 286 (1885) ; Musgrave v.
Musgrave, 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302, 315 (1920) ; 22 A. and E. Ency. (2
ed.) 524. But payment to a third party authorized by only one of the joint
obligees is not sufficient. Moore v. Bevier, 60 Minn. 240, 62 N. W. 281 (1895).
This resembles the rule of N. I. L. §41, since indorsement of a negotiable
instrument is commonly for collection. And though one joint obligee may dis-
charge the obligation he may not alone maintain a suit upon it. Richardson v.
Jones, supra; Fishell v. Evans, 193 N. C. 660, 137 S. E. 865 (1927), promissory
note; Hatfield v. Cabell County Ct., 75 W. Va. 595, 84 S. E. 335 (1915) ; Henry
v. Mt. Pleasant Twp., 70 Mo. 500 (1879). Cf. Delano v. Jacoby, infra note 7.
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decisions have held likewise as to negotiable instruments. 7 Of course,
the common law rule requiring both of two joint payees to indorse in
order to pass title,8 which was enacted into N. I. L. sec. 41,9 does
not specifically cover the case since an "indorsement" placed on the
instrument in order to obtain payment amounts only to a receipt.1 0
But to decide a negotiable instrument question simply by the appli-
cation of the ordinary rule of contracts is to overlook the very essen-
tials in which the commercial law differs from common law-in this
particular type of case, the fact that commercial paper is constantly
drawn jointly to two payees for the express purpose of preventing
either payee from transferring the instrument or receiving the money
without the concurrence of the other.11 Business convenience de-
mands that a drawee who defends by showing payment direct to one
of two joint payees should go further and show either the indorse-
ment of the other payee or his authorization of the payment as made.
And so, while section 41 concerning indorsements admittedly does
not govern the case of a direct payment without intermediate parties,
t Before N. I. L., Bruce v. Bonney, 12 Gray 107, 111 (Mass. 1858), that
one joint payee in possession of note may either receive payment or indorse;
Wright v. Ware, 58 Ga. 150, 152 (1877), assigning artificial reason that onejoint payee is temporarily agent of the other hence like partner; Delano v.
Jacoby, 96 Cal. 275, 31 Pac. 290 (1892), semble. Since N. I. L. but without
reference to it, Park v. Parker, 216 Mass. 405, 103 N. E. 936 (1914), payment
to survivor; Ethington v. Rigg, 173 Ky. 355, 191 S. W. 98 (1917) semble, in a
case where one of several obligees purported to release a mortgage of record
by signing "R, agent Riggs Heirs," he being himself one of them,-proof of his
agency essential. Since N. I. L. and referring to §41 but declaring it inappli-
cable to case of receiving payment. Dewey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256
Mass. 281, 152 N. E. 82 (1926).
'Johnson v. Mangum, 65 N. C. 146 (1871), overruling without reference
dictum in Sneed v. Mitchell's Extrs., 2 N. C. 289, 292 (1796) that "the endorse-
ment by one of two joint payees, is good to transfer the whole contents of the
note to an endorser" (sic) ; "Indorsement by one of several joint payees or
indorsees not partners," 38 A. L. R. 801. Cf. Bruce v. Bonney, stpra note 7.
And compare special English rule relating to dividend warrants, 2 Halsbury,
Laws of England 504, note (s).0 N. I. L. §41, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3022: "Where an instrument
is payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees who are not part-
ners, all must indorse unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the
others." Virginia-Carolina Joint Stk. Land Bk. v. First & Citz. Nati. Bk. of
Eliz. City, 197 N. C. 526, 150 S. E. 34 (1929), drawer v. drawee; Crahe v. Mer-
cantile T. & S. Bk., 295 Ill. 375, 129 N. E. 120, 12 A. L. R. 92 (1920), joint
payee v. drawee; Kaufman v. State Say. Bk., 151 Mich. 65, 114 N. W. 863(1908), joint payee v. indorsee.
"And according to some authorities such indorsement as a receipt may not
be required by the drawee as a condition to payment. Osborn v. Gheen, 16 D.
C. (5 Mack.) 189 (1886). See Klaus, Identification of Holder and Tender of
Receipt on the Counter-Presentation of Checks (1929) 13 MINN. L. REv. 281.11 See e.g., Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank v. Liles, 197 N. C. 413,
149 S. E. 377 (1929).
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the commercial policy which gave rise to that section can only be
perfectly effected and the utility of instruments drawn to joint payees
can only be preserved by a similar policy in both cases.12
The instant case is complicated in some of its aspects by the fact
that the drawee directed the bank to pay his checks as if drawn to
bearer,1 but the present issue is not affected by that fact. And
though the decision on this issue seems to be wholly unsupported by
case authority elsewhere it establishes a desirable precedent.
14
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' Indeed, when it is considered that the drawee is discharged if the funds
actually come into the hands of the one entitled to them even if he did not
indorse at all: Bellv. Murchison Nat. Bk., 196 N. C. 233, 145 S. E. 241 (1928),
7 N. C. L. R. 455, it seems that the provisions of N. I. L. §41 lose all sig-
nificance except in a case where the person holding under the indorsement of
only one joint payee is suing on the instrument. If one joint payee indorsed
alone and sold the instrument to a third person who collected the draft the
debt would be discharged. This is what happened in Dewey v. Metropolitan,
.supra note 7, where the check was "cashed" by one joint payee not at the
counter of the drawee but at another bank. The check, therefore, contrary to
the provision of §41, which the court said had no application, went through
intermediate bands to payment with the genuine indorsement of only one of
the joint payees. If the indorsement by one joint payee were for collection
only the same result would seem to follow even more certainly-although
quaere in Minnesota. See Moore v. Bevier, supra note 6.
i The direction was in writing and was of a sort commonly given to banks
in the tobacco markets -by tobacco buyers who paid farmers by check. The
bank would of course be bound to respect the direction, somewhat as a tele-
graph company would be bound to pay money without identification when so
directed by the transmitter. See W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wells, 50 Fla. 474, 39 So.
838 (1905) and language in Dodge v. Natl. Exch. Bk., 20 Ohio St. 234, 5 Am.
Rep. 648 (1870); Davis v. Lenawee Co. Say. Bk., 53 Mich. 163, 18 N. W. 629
(1884) ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bimetallic Bk., 17 Colo. App. 229, 68 Pac. 115
(1902).
If the payee had requested the drawer to so order his bank, it would seem
that he should stand the loss as he would if a bearer check had been issued
him. But a mere custom for the banks to pay all paper without identification
as if drawn to bearer would hardly affect the rights of a payee holding a check
drawn in plain terms to order.
As between drawer and drawee, the bank could of course charge against
the drawer an item wrongfully paid by his express order. See Mackay Tel.-
Cable Co. v. Ft. Worth Nat'l. Bank., 230 S. W. 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
And it would seem that the drawer would be liable also for the further obliga-
tion imposed on the bank by the instant case in consequence of the depositor's
act.1Professor Lile in forcibly advocating this view adds the following: "If
the Massachusetts rule be sound, paper payable to two or more payees under
N. I. L. §8 (4), becomes, so far as payment is concerned, impliedly payable to
'one or some of the several payees,' under § 8 (5), thus rendering the latter
subsection useless." He also calls attention to the fact that before the N. I. L.
instruments payable in the alternative were not negotiable while those to joint
payees were, as evidence of a wide difference between those two types. BiGE-
LOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CIRc s, (3d. ed.) §147 n. 5.
